Download the 2008 Report Card as a PDF

 

CAPA 2008 Aviation Security Report Card explanation

INTRODUCTION

With this report card, CAPA has endeavored to provide an objective evaluation of ten major aviation security programs. These ten areas of the aviation security system from the “curb to the cockpit” are viewed as the most critical as the line flying pilot performs his or her job.

While some security initiatives have improved over time, others haven’t appreciably changed at all. CAPA understands that some of these items are in the research and development stages but with seven years passed since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 many of these issues should be resolved by now. Another successful attack on the nation’s aviation transportation system would cost the country and the corporations billions in time and treasure while improving the grades of this report card could save lives, families and friends.

CAPA views this report card as responsible reporting on the current status of our nation’s aviation security system.  We enthusiastically applaud the efforts of many whose daily efforts keep us all safe.  Concurrently we must bring attention to and emphasize program weaknesses, in the hopes that decision makers will consciously choose to make necessary changes that will bring the National Aviation Security Strategy to an improved level of safety for all who travel within the U.S. air transportation system.

To improve the process, all of us must participate.  Thank you for playing an active role in securing our skies.

PERIMETER SECURITY  Grade C

Airport perimeter security This represents an improvement from a previous grade of D. Levels of effectiveness of perimeter security still vary from one airport to the next but TSA has taken steps to improve security at the edges of the airport property far from the screening checkpoints. A federal program of random vehicle searches is part of an ongoing effort to prevent bombings at airports. The TSA has also partnered with the U. S. Navy to test a virtual perimeter monitoring system but it has only been deployed at one airport to date. So far efforts to secure the perimeter are focused on the larger metropolitan airports with much work to be done at the smaller regional facilities.

Perimeter security programs provide protections of aircraft in the Air Operations Area (AOA) that includes active runways, taxiways, ramp and gate areas.  All aircraft parking pads (both at the gate and at remote parking pads) should require secure access points and should be protected  from undesirable intruders who may attempt to sabotage aircraft or strategically place explosives on board. 

CAPA recommends that an independent (outside of DHS/TSA) quality analysis airport perimeter security review be conducted for each airport that has commercial departures—regardless of whether it is for passengers or all cargo carriers.  More visible deterrence efforts need to be instituted and ALL airport perimeter fences need to be repaired and enhanced with new technology.

 Aircraft security on ramp:   Protecting our aircraft on the ramp is another layer of security that has been overlooked or ignored.  Often, aircraft are parked at remote spots on the tarmac, away from the view of ramp workers, which ultimately leaves the aircraft vulnerable to unauthorized entry or tampering.

Internationally, a team of inspectors remove a variety of aircraft access panels in order to physically inspect for sabotage and/or unauthorized foreign objects that could harm the aircraft. These inspections take place just prior to departures during the day.  Additionally, each person who attempts to enter the aircraft footprint is challenged by a security guard who compares the person’s ID to that of the aircraft manifest and a current list of workers approved to service the aircraft—prior to aircraft entry.

Domestically, the aircraft receives a less-thorough inspection.  Frequently the inspections are completed late at night by cleaning crews with limited security training.  The aircraft is then left unguarded all night long, often at a remote parking site.  Whether the aircraft is on the gate or at a remote parking pad, they may be boarded or sabotaged.

CAPA recommends that any time there are heightened security alerts at code orange or above, all U.S. commercial aircraft (passenger and cargo) be provided with full-time roving security patrols on the ramp, and that all remote parking sites on the tarmac have full-time security surveillance capable of immediately responding to unauthorized access.

SCREENING PASSENGERS/EMPLOYEES Grade: C/D

Passengers: Passenger portal screening currently emphasizes metal detection, with some passengers randomly identified for additional screening.  However, specific explosives screening capabilities for passengers and carry-on baggage is limited at best. A few airports received the GE “puffer” portals but after a trial period proved slow and unreliable. Currently over 100 of the 200 machines bought and paid for by TSA are now sitting in a warehouse unused.

The screening checkpoint of the future is currently being rolled out at Baltimore Washington Thurgood Marshall International Airport (BWI) and will employ behavior detection officers, travel document checkers, millimeter whole body imagers and advanced X-rays. This use of new technology coupled with the human intelligence of behavioral detection techniques is a welcome change from previous reliance on outdated technology to screen for firearms and sharp objects.

Transportation Security Officers now receive additional training and specialize in identification of explosives and explosive components.  They are also taught Behavioral Pattern Recognition (BPR) skills through the Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT). CAPA fully supports this enhanced training for TSOs and applauds TSA leadership for taking this tack.  Behavioral Pattern Recognition skills should be taught to every TSA passenger portal inspector. 

CAPA recommends that TSA expand BPR/SPOT training, explosives training and continue to employ new technology such as low emission X-Ray screening of passengers.  This technology is being used in Europe and can identify just about any foreign substance on or in a body.  Additionally TSA should encourage development of neutron technology for the purposes of detecting restricted foreign substances—to include explosives, explosive components, weapons, illegal drugs and radiological or bio-hazardous substances.  Also, crewmembers and airline employees who have direct contact with passengers should have various levels of BPR training.

Checked Bags:  The TSA-mandated screening of *100 percent of checked baggage is one of the more solid layers of security currently in practice.  Although it is costly and time-consuming, it is the only way to ensure that potentially dangerous articles are NOT shipped on passenger aircraft in checked baggage.

This screening process should not give the public a false sense of security.  Once screened, checked baggage still offers an opportunity for anyone who has gained ramp access an opportunity to place an IED (improvised explosive device) or other dangerous items into passenger bags prior to loading into cargo bays. Terrorist sleepers successfully employed as workers with ramp access would seldom have their personal items screened prior to entering the ramp – GAO and media reports continue to document failure of adequate background checks for ramp workers.

Explosive Detection: TSA leaders state that explosive detection is one of their biggest challenges when screening passengers, carry-on luggage, checked baggage, and cargo. 

The threat is constantly evolving through new technology.  Current technologies are stagnant and struggle with reprogramming that would allow them to detect a wide range of terrorist’s favorite explosives.  Detection devices must be able to identify older explosives such as triacetone triperoxide/TATP (AA Flight 63, Richard Reid) and simultaneously identify new threats such as the most recent individualized “liquids/gels.”  These chemicals could be disguised and independently brought on board aircraft by different passengers.  Once airborne, the chemicals could then mixed together in flight to create a dangerous explosive substance. 

The United Kingdom “liquid” bomb/bomb parts would most likely have gone undetected at current passenger screening portals. DHS/TSA must drive new technology and overcome the current attitude of “something better is coming.”

CAPA recommends that Congress mandate advanced R&D within the explosives detection field and fund this research appropriately.  Modern explosive detection technologies (such as Millimeter Wave, Trace Portals, X-Ray Backscatter, Thermal Neutron Analysis/TNA, Quadrupole Resonance/QR and Computed Topography/CT) provide unique (liquid, specific chemical signatures) and sometimes overlapping capabilities. These should be deployed both in tandem or overlapping protocols to produce an integrated explosive detection program.

Aircrew: Various reports state that airline crewmembers transit domestic security portals tens of millions of times a year.  Not only does the unnecessary process of inspecting airline crewmembers over and over interfere with expeditious process of passengers, more significantly, it forces TSA security screeners to focus on low-risk passengers when they should be concentrating on high-risk threats.

100 percent of all airline crewmembers must pass strict background checks. Repetitive screening of the same “group” day in and day out does little to enhance security.  Aircrew members are not the threat.

CAPA recommends that proper identification programs using biometric credentialing of all aircrew members and their baggage should exempt them from routine portal screening thereby freeing TSA assets to focus on the real threat.  Random screening of aircrew and their baggage should continue as part of a robust security program.

Workers with Ramp Access:  Congress and the TSA have recognized through multiple incidents of airline employee misconduct, the most recent being the implication of ramp workers at Newark Liberty International Airport in drug smuggling and theft cases, that airline employees with access to critical areas should be positively identified and physically screened. Random physical screening programs for employees with access to AOA and SIDA areas of the airport have been instituted across the aviation security system. This is an improvement but there is still more that can be done. Until TWIC or biometric identification cards can be issued to baggage handlers, office staff, caterers, maintenance and repair staff and airplane cleaners with access to the AOA or SIDA, all access points should have someone visibly checking current IDs. A card with a pin is not secure—anyone can use it to gain access to airport secure areas. 

CAPA recommends that a biometric identification system be installed to positively identify all airline employees as they enter the secure areas of the airport to report to work. Frequent physical screening of airline employees with limited background clearances should be used to maintain a higher level of physical screening for employees with access to the AOA and SIDA areas of the airport.

SCREENING CARGO Grade: D/F

CAPA applauds the passage of Congressman Ed Markey’s (D-MA) Cargo Security Bill in 2007. This bill effectively moves the TSA away from their reliance on the “Known Shipper Program” to a physical inspection based program for cargo carried aboard passenger aircraft. Unfortunately, because of the lobbying efforts of the large commercial cargo carriers, the all-cargo airlines were excluded from this legislative change and are still a vulnerable target for terrorists to exploit.

The new Certified Cargo Screening Program will require physical screening of 50 percent of cargo carried aboard passenger aircraft by February of 2009 and 100 percent by August of 2010. This will be accomplished through physical screening at the airport or at Certified Cargo Screening Facilities off the airport property. The grade of D is still in place at this time because of the limited rollout of this program and the lack of CAPA’s ability to evaluate its effectiveness so far.

Canine Inspections:  The success of the canine program at TSA is one of their shining stars.  Like the FAMS, it has grown from a shell to 400 canine team—no small feat.  The program does have its limitations.  The dogs have a limited sniff time before their nose needs a rest.  The dogs themselves often burn out.  With a 10-week training program the canine division has limited ability to grow.

CAPA recommends that canine inspection teams continue to expand in numbers and broaden their activities to include routine random inspections of both passenger and cargo manifests. Continued appropriations funding is highly encouraged.

Cargo Airlines: Seven years after 9/11, all cargo airlines continue to be one of the weakest links in the aviation security system—largely because of big business lobby efforts.  While these companies make record profits, they continue to put their crews, their cargo and the American public at significant risk.

CAPA recommends that TSA continue to increase actual physical inspection and expand funding for new technology and the expansion of the canine inspection program. CAPA also recommends the resumption of the Air Cargo Working Group to fully review the details of the new cargo security program, evaluate its effectiveness and recommending changes and improvements as the program evolves.

 CREDENTIALING Grade: F

Current airline employee ID badges, FAA Airman (Pilot) Certificates and credentials used by Law Enforcement Officers or FAA Inspectors utilize no biometric data. Verification is based solely on the credential presented, does not require a secondary ID and may have no picture (FAA certificates).  Many of these credentials are lost or stolen and are easily counterfeited.  A badge or ID does not guarantee that the person or the documents are what they assert.

The need for a biometric credentialing program for key transportation workers was first identified in the Aviation Transportation Security Act of 2001.  Several credible organizations have made the same assertions, yet here we are seven years later without a single card issued.  DHS has implemented the rollout of the TWIC card to maritime workers which number over one million. The timeline for a biometric identification system for the aviation system is still three to four years away. The TSA’s ACIS program has manpower and funding but has yet to identify which biometric standard to use.  The fact that a biometric system of identifying airline and airport employees as well as anyone with access to the cockpit and anyone traveling with a firearm has been recommended by numerous oversight entities including the 9/11 Commission but no program has been implemented as of yet is beyond reason.

Flight Deck Crewmembers have all had background checks.  All that needs to be done to get this positive ID program off the ground is procurement and processing of the cards (about $8 each) and final development of a protocol standard for the box that reads the cards.  The cards could be tied directly to a pilot’s employer, their pilot certificate and a biometric function.  The attempt to use a fake card would show up immediately in the system and the imposter could be apprehended in minimal time without ever knowing he/she had been compromised.  

Persons with Flight Deck Access should always be positively identified for reasons stated above.  With biometric IDs, FAMS, FFDOs, law enforcement officers, FAA inspectors and other officials who frequently travel around the aviation system would have access when they need it and their activities could be tracked with each swipe of a card.  These individuals are well vetted by their employers and are trusted agents of the government.  They should have unfettered access to SIDA areas so they can more efficiently do their jobs.

CAPA recommends that all pilots and any government employee or employee of a respective airline with need to access the Flight Deck be issued a biometric ID.  Pilots, FAA officials, FAMS, and other government LEOs with Flight Deck access should be issued biometric IDs as soon as possible. In addition, for pilots, this new biometric credential could be developed in parallel with improved FAA pilot certificates.

CREW TRAINING: SELF DEFENSE:  Grade: C

Classroom training on security issues is provided to each passenger air carrier aircrew member during their annual recurrent training. Unfortunately it is a superficial class with virtually meaningless curriculum.  Three months after the class, most aircrew members don’t remember that they had the training, and those that do can’t tell you what it was about.  The class is supposed to be two hours long with hand-to-hand and escape techniques reviewed and practiced.  It is the experience of CAPA pilots that this training is inadequate and is a frail attempt at complying with the law.  Presently, all cargo carrier crewmembers are not required to receive the same kind of security and self-defense training.

Self-defense training has improved with the program now sponsored by the Federal Air Marshal Service. The one day training event has had limited participation in the past due to its being offered at local Community College campuses away from the airport property. More than 40 percent of aircrew members commute to the airport where their trip sequence begins but the FAMS have corrected this flaw and moved the program to the airports where employees are based. The course must still be completed on the employees’ days off at employee expense but the proximity to the workplace should increase participation numbers.

CAPA recommends that the one-day self-defense (eight-hour class) program become a mandatory one-time class given at each respective air carrier’s recurrent training facilities for both passenger and cargo carriers—one level of training.  Annual refresher classes should be provided on a voluntary basis.  Airlines will challenge this as too expensive—CAPA submits that we cannot afford to skimp on crewmember awareness and self-defense training.  The incorporation of Behavioral Pattern Recognition training similar to the TSA’s own Screening Passengers with Observation Techniques (SPOT) is also recommended to enhance aircrew recognition of possible threats during the boarding process and subsequent removal before proceeding to the airborne phase of flight.

THREAT INTELLIGENCE Grade: D

Under current TSA policy, threat intelligence information, relevant Information Circulars (ICs), and operational Security Directives (SDs) are provided directly to all commercial airline (passenger and cargo) corporate security managers.  TSA contends it is the responsibility of the airline managers to determine both the content and method by which crewmembers will be informed of threat information prior to departure.  In plain language, there is no requirement for aircrew members to receive timely or meaningful information—for now, only the airline operators are notified.

In practice, ever since 9/11, most airline corporate security managers continue to demonstrate a reluctance to pass critical threat information to crewmembers, and sometimes simply do not. This is a dated issue highlighted again in December 2001 (AAL Flt 63, Richard Reid Shoe Bomber), when government regulatory agencies failed to ensure that airline crews were notified of current critical security ICs.  Unfortunately, little has changed since 2001. 

Pre-flight security alerts are not provided to all crew members on a timely basis.  The TSA does not require aircrew to be updated with alert messages, rather they cop out of the process by sending the alerts to the companies and allow them to devise when or even if the crew members will be notified.  Unfortunately, few airlines provide real time information to their crewmembers. 

To our knowledge, American Airlines is a notable exception.  American maintains a secure, TSA-approved web site for crewmember access that provides daily updated real-time threat information to AA crewmembers.  Previous TSA officials recommended that other airlines follow suit, but to date, CAPA is not aware of any that have.

CAPA recommends that all crewmembers are provided a secure Web site they can review from home or in their respective operations areas important or breaking security information.  Additionally, when a security status in the United States is raised or lowered, each crewmember should be challenged prior to boarding their aircraft as to whether they have received respective security alerts by appropriate airline personnel.  All crewmembers should be advised on the requirement for increased vigilance and specific cautions prior to flight.

Airborne security alerts are virtually nonexistent across the industry.  In order to ensure the security of flight the Captain (FAA designated In Flight Security Coordinator, ISC) must know of any serious security threats which may require immediate action on the part of the airborne crew to maintain a secure aircraft---particularly the flight deck. In-flight notification of real time security events---similar to the recent “liquid bomb” threats affecting flights from the UK ---must be clearly communicated to all airborne flights to increase crewmember awareness of a particular threat. 

Richard Reid’s shoe-bomb attempt was not passed to American’s own crews, much less to other carriers.  If TSA had a viable “security alert network” that could efficiently get information to airborne crews, much like our FAA weather advisories, once notified, airborne crewmembers could potentially avert destructive attempts by airborne terrorists, such as a shoe bombing or the assembling of bomb components on board airborne aircraft.  Currently the TSA has no program that ensures the Captain of an airborne flight receives necessary security information in a timely or effective manner.

CAPA recommends that important security information is passed directly to airborne crewmember through the FAA air traffic controllers’ radio communications network or passed through internal company communications using ARINC ACARS text messaging system. This is a relatively simple low-cost process and should be implemented as soon as possible.

MISSILE DEFENSE (MANPADS)    Grade: F

(MAN-Portable Air Defense System or shoulder fired missiles)

Some 500,000 to 700,000 portable missiles have been produced since their inception in the 1960s and thousands are available on the black market, according to Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D., CEO of the Lexington Institute.  Thompson believes that many terrorist groups currently possess these shoulder-fired missiles.  He reports from TSA records that 35 MANPAD attacks have occurred worldwide since 1979, killing 640 people.  Although no missiles have been smuggled into the United States (not that anyone will admit), an estimated 10,000 missiles are missing from the Russian inventory and another 10,000 are unaccounted from Iraq ’s inventory.

In a 2003 New Jersey FBI sting, three arms dealers were arrested for attempting to sell the first of 200 Russian SA-18 missiles.  Apparently, Sudanese terrorists planned to explicitly use the SA-18 missiles against American airliners.  The threat is real and it is only a matter of time before terrorists attempt to shoot at a U.S. airliner with a MANPAD.

Missile defense systems are complicated and expensive.  The best defense is really offensive in nature—don’t let them into the country.  However, is it probable that the FBI and other counter-terrorism groups will be successful 100 percent of the time?  We think not. 

The conundrum is how to best defend against a low-risk event today, that could turn into a high-risk threat tomorrow, given program complexities and multibillion-dollar program costs.  Additionally, the TSA must avoid the temptation to develop counter-MANPAD initiatives based solely on high-technology missiles.  There are tens of thousands of low-tech missiles that can damage our aircraft.  CAPA does not believe one system will meet the entire threat spectrum of today and tomorrow.

Although BAE, Inc. and Northrop Grumman have developed, with government funding, working airborne countermeasures to the MANPAD threat, no operational system has been implemented for civilian aircraft today. 

CAPA recommends that DHS take a balanced approach to this complicated problem by investing in strong preventative measures while they simultaneously continue research and development of technology that can be readily adapted to civilian aircraft.  Congress should continue to fund MANPAD research and, at a minimum, retrofit all CRAFT (civilian aircraft called into military service to support troop and logistic lift requirements) airplanes with cost-effective airborne MANPAD countermeasures as soon as practicable.

FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS Grade: B

The Federal Air Marshal Service promotes confidence in the nation’s civil aviation system through the effective deployment of Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) to detect, deter, and defeat hostile acts targeting U.S. air carriers, airports, passengers and crews.

Since FAMS was moved from Immigration and Customs Enforcement to the TSA, Assistant Administrator Director Dana Brown has embraced an entirely new philosophy—the FAMS actually has a long-term strategy and goals for both the FAMS and Law Enforcement divisions of the TSA.  Federal Air Marshals have an ever-expanding role in homeland security and work closely with other law enforcement agencies to accomplish their mission.  Currently, air marshals staff positions at organizations such as the National Counterterrorism Center , the National Targeting Center and the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces. 

CAPA recommends Congress consider increasing appropriations for these valuable programs as the FAMS seeks new ways to protect the airborne aircraft while concurrently developing new procedures that strive to keep the terrorists out of airports and away from aircraft.

PRIMARY/SECONDARY COCKPIT BARRIERS Grade: B/D

CAPA continues to seek legislation that will mandate secondary barriers to protect the Flight Deck when the cockpit door is opened in flight.  The new doors protect the cockpit airborne as long as the door is closed, however the doors are completely ineffective when the door is opened for operational or physiological needs.  Secondary barriers should be mandated and installed where practical on all commercial cargo and passenger air carriers.  This is a low-cost program that would significantly enhance protection of the aircraft airborne. Primary and Secondary Cockpit barriers are not mandated for all-cargo airlines.

FEDERAL FLIGHT DECK OFFICER PROGRAM Grade: C

Since its inception, the FFDO program has faced significant pushback from the Executive Office and government officials worried about mission creep and unwieldy pilots.  Congress had the faith and foresight to force the FFDO program through legislation.  As it turns out, Congress was correct: today the FFDO program is one of the most efficient and professional law enforcement programs in the government having protected millions of commercial passenger and cargo flights to date. 

The FFDO program is the last line of defense for an airborne aircraft full of passengers and/or cargo.  When security programs fail to defeat terrorists’ destructive efforts on the ground and in the cabin, armed FFDO pilots become the last hope of passengers and crew for maintaining the integrity of the flight deck and control of the aircraft 

The FFDO program is perhaps the most cost-effective and operationally efficient security program in existence today.  FFDOs provide more than 25 times as much airborne coverage of the flight deck as do Air Marshals.  This FFDO coverage now creates an opportunity for FAMs to expand their scope of effectiveness on the ground, and devote more time and assets to keeping terrorists off the aircraft rather than trying to stop them in flight

CAPA recommends Congress consider increasing appropriations for the efficient and cost-effective FFDO program.  Increased funding for both the FFDO program and the FAMS program will provide for more armed pilots airborne, and enhance FAMS’ deterrence and prevention efforts on the ground—the ultimate goal of every security program.  An FFDO program limited by lack of funding could be a tragic mistake that may permit another hostile takeover of an airborne aircraft, possibly leading to a repeat of the horrific 9/11 tragedy.